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Postmemory 
The future has collapsed upon itself, and we are burdened more by what we come after than 
by what awaits us. (Boyarin, 1996, p.143) 
And yet, at the same time, this is exactly the crux of the second generation’s difficulty: that it 
has inherited not experience, but its shadows. The uncanny, in Freud’s formulation, is the 
sensation of something that is both very alien and deeply familiar, something that only the 
unconscious knows. If so, then the second generation has grown up with the uncanny. And 
sometimes, it needs to be said, wrestling with shadows can be more frightening, or more 
confusing, than struggling with solid realities. (Hoffman, 2005, p.66). 
Beginning by Looking Back 
Eva Hoffman’s reflections on second generation experience, the ‘second generation’ here being the 
children of Holocaust survivors, lead us straight into the question of what it means to inherit 
suffering, and indeed what it means to ‘inherit’ another’s experience at all.  What are these 
‘shadows’ to which she refers? Are they the experiences that the parental generation has had, 
transmitted precisely through their overt behaviour – the stories they told their children about 
their lives, their overprotection or silent avoidances, their investment in and ambitions for their 
children (‘not letting Hitler win’- Hoffman, 2005, p.66)? Or are they something passed on more 
subtly, as if through a kind of telepathic process, whereby the material implanted in the child is 
impossibly strange and overwhelmingly incomprehensible, and so remains like this, shadowing 
psychic life?  To what extent, we might also ask, is this kind of shadowing a heritage of those 
‘traumatic’ experiences that cannot be talked about easily, but are freighted with a significance 
that might not be interpretable to those who have not actually lived them? Is it ever possible to 
absorb such experiences if one has not been there oneself, because it is only people who have 
been through a traumatic experience who can appreciate fully what it means? A terrible, dark 
Jewish joke quoted by Devorah Baum captures some of the essence of this difficulty, albeit framed 
in pain and theological bitterness. 
Elie Wiesel goes up to Heaven, meets God. He tells God a Holocaust joke: God doesn’t laugh. 
Wiesel shrugs: ‘I guess you had to be there.’ (Baum, 2017, p.46) 
This ‘joke’ is about theodicy: God cannot have been present at Auschwitz. But it also plays on the 
question of identification with suffering: is it possible to ‘get the joke’ if one has not had the 
experience oneself, but only engaged with its consequences indirectly? Yet if this is not possible, 
then the meaning of experiences will rarely be conveyable from one person to another, and the 
testimonies of those who were directly involved have to be received in silence, without anyone else 
having the authority to comment or speak about how they have been affected. No-one else would 
have the right to claim understanding, because only those who have gone through the events have 
testimonies that can count. There are some who argue this way; even Primo Levi, whose literary 
witnessing has possibly had more impact than anyone else’s, doubted that he could speak in the 
name of those who had perished. Here is the famous passage on this issue, much quoted and 
referenced and on the whole assented to whilst also being denied: 
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I must repeat – we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is an uncomfortable notion, 
of which I have become conscious little by little… We who were favoured by fate have tried, 
with more or less wisdom, to recount not only our fate, but also that of the others, the 
submerged; but this was a discourse ‘on behalf of third parties,’ the story of things seen from 
close by, not experienced personally. When the destruction was terminated, the work 
accomplished was not told by anyone, just as no one ever returned to recount his own death. 
(Levy, 1988, pp.63-4). 
Yet it is clear from the immense readership that Levi’s books have had, and their status as 
paradigmatic testimonies, that his challenge, despite being ‘repeated’, has not been fully absorbed. 
Or at least, his and others’ attempts to speak ‘on behalf of third parties’ has largely been treated 
with proper seriousness and respect. All this is to say, it does seem possible to convey something of 
the experience; and if this is not the whole story, if we can never know for sure what would have 
been said by those who cannot speak, there is sufficient in these testimonies to be getting along 
with. Maybe the ‘shadows’ that Hoffman refers to apply here: the shadows thrown by experiences 
may not be the experiences themselves, but they have the shape and possibly even the texture of 
those experiences, and they seem capable of passing across boundaries, of seeping from one 
person to another. In addition, it is possible that the shadows, examined closely, also make the 
original experiences visible to those who might not otherwise be able to look directly at them.  
Discussing intergenerational connections, and the meaning of the passing of a generation, Lisa 
Baraitser (2017) makes a link between the experience of being affected by something one cannot 
quite identify, and the processes of reflection embedded in the practice of psychoanalysis. She 
writes (p.102) that the ‘attempt to make sense of something that one knows has occurred, and yet 
in some profound way one seems to have missed, is at the core of a psychoanalytic sensibility in 
which events come to be significant after an originary event that has bypassed memory and 
language.’ According to Baraitser, this experience is at the heart of what Freud refers to as 
‘historical truth’, ‘the indelible trace of experience on the psyche prior to the capacity for the event 
to be encoded in a recallable way, a trace that can only be reproduced rather than remembered, as 
its original form is lost’ (Ibid.). This is a complicated idea, but it seems to introduce into ‘ordinary’ 
life something that is more often seen as confined to the experience of trauma. Traumatic 
experiences are held to be too overpowering to be grasped as they occur, so instead they are 
somehow ‘gone through’ without being properly processed, ‘becoming significant’, as Baraitser 
puts it, only later on if it becomes possible to think about them in a calmer way, with more 
perspective or distance. The existence of such experiences seems undeniable. Freud’s (1920) post-
World War One examination of traumatic dreams showed how they represent a continued return 
to the scene of suffering, maybe as a way of trying to deal with it – to master it in important ways 
or even (considering that we are talking about bad dreams) to wake up from it. Faced with 
suffering that we cannot fully understand, we either shut ourselves off from it (denial and 
forgetting of troubling occurrences being prevalent in everyday life), or we keep worrying away at 
it until it begins to make some sense. What Baraitser suggests, however, is that this is a 
psychoanalytic norm: everything happens later than it should. The actual experience is missed yet 
still remains, not as a ‘memory’ but as some kind of an ‘event.’ 
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Unhappy Memories  
The account just given goes some way towards ‘normalising’ trauma by suggesting that much 
ordinary memory is a matter of recovering the traces of unprocessed experience from the past – 
whether our own or that of our forebears – and somehow making them more manageable, 
‘binding’ them into a meaningful encounter or narrative structure. If it is the case that the routine 
experience of all children is to be subjected to the ‘excessive’ messages coming from the adult 
world around, as Jean Laplanche (1999) suggests, then it is also true that every human subject will 
have implanted in her or him the unconscious echoes of the parental unconscious, back through 
time to many previous generations. In this, there looms the issue of how to deal with the shadowy 
‘memories’ passed on by those who have come before us – including in this for the moment 
unconscious sensations and echoes of a past that was not our own. What should one do with those 
memories, especially when they are disturbing or unsettling? The tendency is to think that when 
we are haunted by ghostly figures and events from the past, the ‘shadows’ to which Hoffman 
refers, it is because the issues that they raise – mostly of maltreatment, violence, untimeliness and 
trauma – have not been resolved and continue to fester, becoming a kind of poison in the 
bloodstream of the present. What haunts us psychically is, in this rendering, something which has 
not been dealt with rightly and so is best interpreted as an injustice. This places responsibility for 
dealing with these ghosts not on the individuals who are possessed by them, but on the 
circumstances – let us call them the ‘social conditions’ – that impede their laying to rest. It is to be 
found in the fabric of history and culture, embedded in the symbolic structures of society that 
maintain the liveliness of some memories whilst marginalising others. Sometimes what haunts us is 
a hurt we have suffered, or one we have caused others; sometimes it comes from elsewhere, as in 
the example of a previous generation; very often it is some kind of unmourned loss. In many 
respects it is always a message or voice, or something that feels embodied and that worries away 
at us until we can no longer ignore it or deny its existence.  
The attitude we take towards such ‘remains’ is crucial. It is connected to the psychoanalytic idea 
that there is a kind of ‘ethics of truth’ that recognises that there are things we do not want to know 
about, many things that are too hard to bear; but that however understandable it is that we should 
be tempted to look away, we need nevertheless to try to see honestly and clearly what is really 
there. The world is difficult, psychic life is difficult, there is no easy route through this typically 
psychoanalytic tragic vision; yet we are called upon to witness it, in others and in ourselves. 
Without such witnessing, which for the moment we can code as a mode of remembering, reality 
slips away ‘into the shadows’, marked out by social as well as personal processes of denial. Injustice 
follows from this, as experiences of suffering are obscured and the individual and society are 
infected with a culture of lying. This is why, for instance, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi stresses the issue 
of remembrance, although with some ambivalence, at the end of Zachor, his book on Jewish 
history and memory. Even though he recognises the danger of remembering too much, too bitterly, 
so that one becomes mired in a position that refuses to allow things to move on (‘I will never forget 
what you did to me!’), he regards the danger of forgetting as much greater. ‘If this be the choice,’ 
he writes (Yerushalmi, 1989, pp.116-7), ‘I will take my stand on the side of “too much” rather than 
“too little,” for my terror of forgetting is greater than my terror of having too much to remember.’ 
He then asks, poignantly and relevantly, ‘Is it possible that the antonym of “forgetting” is not 
“remembering,” but justice?’ This makes memory an ethical issue, which surely it is, even if this 
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claim should be mitigated by awareness that the kind of memory (bitter, sensitive, reflective, 
sanctifying) might matter. 
As a first step, then, it might be suggested that in order to achieve justice we have first to 
remember the hurt that has been suffered. This is very much the thrust of contemporary 
memorialising, which assumes that by uncovering the traumatic past it might become possible to 
amend it, or at least to acknowledge it and find a way to apportion responsibility for it. Hiddenness, 
silence, covering-over; these are not states that allow one to come to terms with suffering. Yet 
these widespread processes of denial demonstrate the active nature of forgetting: it is not that 
something slips from mind (‘Oh dear, I forgot about the Holocaust!’), or at least not when we are 
talking about significant events. It is rather that events that are hard to bear – perhaps because 
they are traumatising, but also perhaps because they make us culpable – are often more 
comfortably set aside than recalled. This is one of the few definite truths uncovered by 
psychoanalysis. Keeping a ghost at bay is very hard work: you have to keep trying not to notice it, 
keep pretending that it is not speaking, that the things that move around in the dark are not really 
there at all. Of course, this also means that the ghost remains dissatisfied; that not only is there no 
chance of justice, but there is not even a basic act of recognition, something that is fundamental to 
the essential process of humanising. That is to say: if I forget you, drive you out of my mind; then 
you no longer exist for me; you and your suffering, and any part I might have in it, are no longer 
real.  Anxiety about this and about what it can do to humanity as a whole fuels a wide variety of 
contemporary ‘Jewish’ propositions about recognition of others as a fundamental ethical stance, 
from the writings of Emmanuel Levinas to Judith Butler, from Primo Levi to all who come after him. 
Being unrecognised and forgotten is not what most people wish for. 
The urgency of the problem of how to learn from the relatively recent past in order not to repeat 
its devastating effects, a problem that revolves around the ethics of memory and history, has 
combined with an awareness that later generations of victims and perpetrators – the ‘post-’ 
generations – may find themselves inhibited in relation to moving forwards precisely because they 
are not truly ‘post-’ at all. Still haunted by what has gone before them, still infused with the 
shadows of others’ experiences, these more contemporary subjects are not in any way free to 
relinquish their pasts. It is as if they are stained with the experiences of their predecessors, which is 
passed on in some way through stories and also through selective silences, as well as through the 
older generation’s ways of handling themselves and the personal and cultural representations of 
their situation. Hoffman (2005) explains the impact of this as something pre-cognitive: the child 
grows up in the shadow of the traumatic experience, so that it functions not as something to know 
about, but as something to inhabit. ‘We who come after do not have memories of the Holocaust’ 
she writes (p.6). ‘Even from the most intimate proximity I could not form “memories” of the Shoah 
or take my parents’ memories as my own. Rather, I took in that first information as a sort of fairy 
tale deriving not so much from another world as from the centre of the cosmos: an enigmatic but 
real fable.’ The ‘centre of the cosmos’ is one full of dread and suffering, but that is simply how it is; 
that is the nature of the reality imbibed, to a greater or lesser degree (we do not know how much 
variation there is, and must remain cautiously empirical about this) by the following generation. 
Hoffman goes on (p.13): ‘the early awareness of suffering created an unconscious, or preconscious, 
ethics, and … in this system, just as war was the ground of being, so pain was the ground of 
personhood. The presence of suffering was powerful enough so that it had to be absorbed; but 
there was also an imperative to remain loyal to it, to make up for it, to provide solace.’ This is a 
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duly complex assertion. The ‘ethics’ Hoffman refers to seems to be one based in a necessary 
response to suffering, recognising it (remaining ‘loyal to it’) and somehow making recompense for 
it – a phenomenally demanding set of tasks, especially, as many second generation memoirs attest, 
for a child. But the founding statement is just as interesting: war as the ground of being – the war 
defined everything – making pain the ground of personhood. We should no doubt return to this 
pain; for the present it is simply worth noting that as ‘the ground of personhood’ it not only 
penetrates everything, but it is also related to as that which gives depth to being. Perhaps part of 
the legacy of trauma is then this: pain continues, from one generation to another, as the defining 
characteristic of what life is about. Is this a miserabilist legacy, or one that can be confronted? 
Hoffman herself has some faith in psychoanalysis and the greater psychological-mindedness of the 
postgeneration; but can psychoanalysis take on so much? 
Postmemory 
It is the idea of ‘post-ness’ that begins to resonate here. Hoffman uses the term to refer to the 
generation after, articulating the perception that the postgeneration has a different experience of 
events than the ‘adult’ one. The adults, she suggests, will ask, ‘what happened?’ and then try to 
work out its meaning; but the children imbibing the foundational pain through their intense 
relations with their parents will have a deep sense of meaning (‘pain’) and then have to find what it 
is that gives rise to it. This complicates the question of memory, for what is being remembered is 
not the event but the feeling or sensation: the unknowable ‘something’ that is communicated 
through the parent’s enigmatic message is primary, its translation into recognisable events and 
experiences lagging very much after, and subject to many vagaries and distortions. This means that 
the ‘post-’ of the later generation is more than a statement of chronology; it defines a different 
way of being in the world, in which what is perceived first is the realisation of something lurking, a 
threat or loss or deep injury. This complexity of experience can be seen fully present in the area of 
‘postmemory’ studies, which is concerned with understanding how it can be that a person might 
feel inhabited by memories that come from somewhere or someone else – notably, from the 
traumatised generation. One of the founders of this field of study, Marianne Hirsch, realises this 
complexity all too well. 
‘Postmemory’ describes the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, 
collective and cultural trauma of those who came before – to experiences they ‘remember’ 
only by means of the stories, images and behaviors among which they grew up. But these 
experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute 
memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated 
not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation. To grow up with 
overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or 
one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s life stories displaced, even evacuated, by our 
ancestors. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still 
defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past, 
but their effects continue into the present. (Hirsch, 2012, p.5)  
‘Postmemory’ is a paradoxical term because, as Hirsch fully realises, both the idea of ‘post-’ and its 
coding as a form of ‘memory’ might be controversial. It is hard to think of something as ‘post’ if it 
continues, though notions like ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’ show that this can be 
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done, and ‘postcolonialism’ is perhaps only the most tellingly relevant instance of a ‘post’ that is 
still submerged in its historical circumstances: Hirsch notes (Ibid.) that it ‘does not mean the end of 
the colonial but its troubling continuity.’ She goes on, ‘We certainly are, still, in the era of “posts”, 
which – for better or worse – continue to proliferate.’ The idea of ‘posttraumatic’ fits in here as 
well: the problem in determining ‘post-trauma’, whether or not in the official diagnostic field of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, is that the after-effects of trauma are often such that in one way or 
another it continues, so that there is no real ‘post’ at all.  
Nevertheless, the ‘post’ appellation has considerable appeal in contemporary times, suggesting a 
general culture of melancholy that sees the important things as being in the past, with everything 
new being defined in terms of that ‘shadow’. This is certainly consistent with both Hoffman’s and 
Hirsch’s descriptions of the penetration of the post-generation’s consciousness by the 
overwhelming experiences of the past. Hoffman explains this clearly in relation to the struggles of 
the second generation to feel that their own concerns could have any importance in comparison 
with the enormity of their parents’ suffering. 
The overwhelming power, the incontrovertible significance of survivors’ histories – the epics 
and the odysseys – installed in many of their children (this is a staple of second-generation 
testimony) a dogged sense of their own insignificance, a conviction that the ordinary problems 
and incidents of their own lives could not possibly matter, that their small hurts and fears 
were so trivial as to be hardly worth mentioning, or indeed feeling. (Hoffman, 2005, p. 69) 
Defining oneself and one’s era only in relation to what has gone before (‘post’) risks evacuating the 
present of meaning; yet this is how things seem to feel, not just personally, but culturally too in 
relation to a growing sense of the thinness of experience. Perhaps this is one reason for the 
emergence of a particular facet of what has come to be called ‘trauma culture’ (Luckhurst, 2008), 
which is that having been in some way traumatised can become under some conditions a claim to 
testimonial status, as if only those who have had direct access to suffering can speak properly of it. 
This extends the argument about witnessing mentioned above (Levi’s ‘we are not the true 
witnesses’) and also has parallels with other situations where experience is seen to have greater 
evidential value than symbolic representation – for example, when psychoanalysts claim that what 
they encounter in the consulting room cannot be adequately expressed and also cannot be 
challenged, in a kind of ‘that’s all very well, but I know from my experience’ vein of argument. 
These retreats into a discourse of direct understanding derived solely from experience seem 
regressive and antagonistic to processes of thoughtfulness that are also characteristic of 
psychoanalysis and indeed warn against experience as the defining feature of insight. We know 
from psychoanalysis that experience cannot be trusted; or more precisely, that our capacity to read 
meaning into experience is limited, battered on all sides by our emotional states, our wishes and 
fears, and also by the nature of the experience itself. If something is ‘traumatic’ it is precisely 
because of that that it is difficult to speak of or understand, and needs drawing out through the 
work of thought and interlocution. To be clear, this is not, of course, an argument against the 
reality of experience or of trauma, but rather an attempt to read the fascination with the ‘post’ 
symptomatically, as having to do with the power of that experience and the related sensation that 
contemporary life is drained of significance. As Hirsch (2012, p.5) notes in the quotation given 
earlier, ‘To grow up  with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that 
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preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s own life stories displaced, even 
evacuated, by our ancestors.’ 
Similarly, there is a question of what is meant by ‘memory’ in ‘postmemory’, when what is being 
pointed to is not necessarily a memory at all, but a representation (or gap in representation) that 
emerges from the actual or blocked memories of others, possibly even those so far back that there 
has been no contact between them and the supposedly ‘postmemorising’ subject. The idea that 
‘remembering’ is ‘only by means of the stories, images and behaviors among which they grew up’ 
and is ‘mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation’ suggests a 
constructive process of invention – which is true to some degree of all memory, but is nevertheless 
different from what is usually meant when we say ‘I remember this or that.’ It is possible to argue 
from here that the phenomena of postmemory have called into question our ordinary notion of 
memory itself as something based on our direct experience, however much it might also be 
constructed and worked on by the various cognitive and unconscious processes with which we are 
familiar. Perhaps memory is not such a private thing after all, but is always socially mediated, a 
cultural affair; or maybe the affective immanence of ‘memories’ that belong to other people is one 
common experience that deserves the appellation ‘memory’ because it is felt as such, it is owned 
by the subject as if the experience were her or his. But it is also arguable that it is worth 
maintaining a distinction between memory and other types of communication of experiences, so 
that what is passed down from one generation to another is understood to be distinct – albeit not 
necessarily any less powerful – from what one has gone through oneself.  
Hirsch herself emphasises the difference between postmemory and memory in relation to issues of 
embodiment, enactment and recollection; but she also wants to retain the terminology to 
distinguish memory from history, as something more personally felt. ‘Postmemory is not identical 
to memory,’ she writes (2005, p.31); ‘it is “post”; but, at the same time, I argue, it approximates 
memory in its affective force and its psychic effects.’ She makes a series of careful conceptual 
discriminations that are worth holding onto. Memory is distinct from history because of its 
affective charge; postmemory is different from memory itself because it is not formed through a 
process of recall but through actively constructive processes, and whilst these are components of 
all memories, postmemory is first and foremost an ‘imaginative’ process, an act of identification 
and creative response. What interests Hirsch most, however, is perhaps not postmemory itself but 
what she calls ‘postmemorial work,’ which she distinguishes from the ‘rememory’ that she 
associates with traumatic repetition in which what is visible is a kind of stuckness that makes the 
past dominant over present life. For Hirsch, postmemorial work is creative, attempting to find a 
way to absorb postmemory and make it anew. The differentiating move seems to be between the 
kind of repetition that invites a ‘retraumatising’ experience and the kind that moves things on by 
actively reworking the material that returns. Here is Hirsch’s elaborated account of this distinction, 
framed in the context of some well-known Holocaust photographs that through their ‘obsessive 
repetition, constitute a similar screen of unchanging fragments, congealed in a memory with 
unchanging content’ (Hirsch, 2005, p.121). She writes about this: 
In repeatedly exposing themselves to the same pictures, postmemorial viewers can produce in 
themselves the effects of traumatic repetition that plague the victims of trauma, even as they 
attempt to mobilize the protective power of the homeopathic shield. As the images repeat the 
trauma of looking, they disable, in themselves, any restorative attempts. It is only when they 
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are redeployed, in new texts and new contexts, that they regain a capacity to enable a 
postmemorial working through. The aesthetic strategies of postmemory are specifically about 
such an attempted, and yet an always postponed, repositioning and reintegration. (Hirsch, 
2005, p.122) 
The balance that has to be struck here is between identifying so strongly with the image that the 
viewer is traumatised her or himself; and repudiating the image so that it is seen as stale and 
unmoving.  In the broader context of witnessing, this is a very familiar and central issue: how to 
balance the response to testimony so as not to ‘colonise’ the testifier’s account, reducing it to 
something the witness already knows; or to over-identify with it and so become useless to the 
testifier; or to distance oneself from it in a repudiating way. For Hirsch, the task is to use the 
testimony in a process of creative reinvention, building on the characteristic of postmemory as 
imagination but offering ‘new contexts’ for the reproduced image (in this photographic case) or the 
memory itself. This has a strong psychoanalytic resonance. As Freud (1920) made clear in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, psychoanalysis can be understood as a practice of repetition and a practice 
of confronting repetition. The past repeats in the form of the ‘return of the repressed’, and if that is 
all that happens then little can change. The task of psychoanalysis is therefore to allow and 
recognise this repetition, but to find a way of reimagining it – the process that Freud calls ‘working 
through’. It is the repetitive psychoanalytic confrontation with the repetitive emergence of 
repressed material that allows the patient to do more than simply repeat; and this entails precisely 
the action of reimagining in a way that gives the ‘haunting’ material its due, whilst also allowing 
something new to begin to occur. Hirsch argues that artistic work can do this too; but it is a 
challenge for it to do so, just as it is in the space of analysis. 
Working Through 
Although the notion and terminology of postmemory is worth taking seriously, my own preference 
is for the even more widespread vocabulary of ‘haunting’ and ghostliness. This is because the 
notion of haunting embraces the sense of being occupied by something that has come from some 
other place or time and is usually not willed by the subject, but somehow possesses the subject 
against its own conscious intentions. It leaves open the question of how this happens (through 
speaking and silence, but also through ‘occult’ means of connection with what has gone before, 
hidden cultural resonances perhaps, or mediated histories or processes of psychological and 
sociological ‘contagion’) and it focuses especially on the consequences of loss. It is also peculiarly 
psychoanalytic in its resonances, both because of the occult themes in early psychoanalysis (an 
interest in telepathy and ‘doubles’ in particular – Frosh, 2013) and because of the centrality of 
processes of transmission in psychoanalysis to this day. For instance, at important moments from 
his paper on ‘Little Hans’ onwards, Freud uses the vocabulary of haunting to convey something of 
the task and practice of psychoanalysis. ‘In an analysis,’ he writes (Freud, 1909, p.123), ‘a thing 
which has not been understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost, it cannot rest until the 
mystery has been solved and the spell broken.’ For psychoanalysis, haunting is a central trope, 
eventually becoming formally codified as the ‘return of the repressed’ indexed above (Freud, 
1920), but visible in all its theorising and in its practice, in the ever-present repetitions and iterative 
processes that take place as the patient speaks of her or his concerns, under the pressure of 
unconscious ideas. Examining how one is troubled by one’s own past is the commonplace field of 
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psychoanalytic encounter; but being troubled by others’ experiences, and specifically by one’s 
relationship to, and possible responsibility for, them is equally central. Both these elements are 
relevant to the exploration of postmemory and haunting, as ‘personal’ experiences come to be 
understood as saturated by relationships with others and by the social, cultural and historical 
contexts out of which they arise. 
If it is possible to consider a whole culture as ‘haunted’, as some contemporary theorists do, then 
perhaps we can think of the many ghostly returns with which we are confronted – symbolic returns 
of myth, memory and identity; material returns of violence and of intimacy and care – as uncanny 
moments that reflect the dynamics of both personal and social life. Remembering in the active way 
Hirsch identifies, which means doing postmemorial work rather than being stuck in postmemory, 
then becomes an assertively political and emancipatory procedure as well as an aspect of 
psychoanalytic ‘working-through.’ As Freud (1914) clearly articulated, remembering is one thing; 
repeating another; working through is necessary to escape them both. ‘This working-through of the 
resistances may in practice turn out to be an arduous task for the subject of the analysis and a trial 
of patience for the analyst,’ wrote Freud (p.155-6). ‘Nevertheless it is a part of the work which 
effects the greatest changes in the patient and which distinguishes analytic treatment from any 
kind of treatment by suggestion.’ What this means is that remembering something is only the 
beginning of a process of living freely; and postmemorialising is similarly ‘an arduous task.’ 
The dynamics of memory participate in this set of issues too. In his examination of History and 
Memory after Auschwitz, Dominick LaCapra (1998) develops a sensitive account of the relationship 
between memory and trauma that relies heavily on the Freudian notion of ‘working through’ and 
that also attempts to face the complexities of responsibility – the question of who can be 
memorialised and under what circumstances, and what the limits of memorialising might be. In a 
manner resonant of Ferenczi’s (1949) famous description of the out-of-body experiences of the 
abused child, LaCapra acknowledges that during a trauma the imagination might act in a protective 
way, lifting the person out of the experience; but afterwards, he notes, ‘the imagination may be 
overwhelmed by hallucinations, flashbacks, and other traumatic residues that resist the potentially 
healing role of memory-work’ (p. 181). This means that ‘memory-work’ may require a diminishing 
of imagination, and this might be especially so for those of the ‘post’ generation for whom it is 
particularly difficult to test the imaginative realm against direct memories of one’s own, 
presumably because of the shadowing effect that Hoffman described. LaCapra comments,  
Notably for those born later, these events may, through a kind of posttraumatic effect, prompt 
a generalized hyperbolic or exorbitant style that at times becomes indiscriminate and verges 
on paradoxically bland sensationalism, which may undermine critical judgment and obscure, 
or provide too one-sided a resolution of, the problem of the actual and desirable relations 
between excess and normative limits. (LaCapra, 1998, p. 181) 
Without belittling the impact of trauma on either first or later generations – and he is far from 
doing this – LaCapra is working with a kind of rationalist but psychoanalytically imbued framework 
for understanding that emphasises the importance of placing a limit on the imaginative, 
identificatory processes that particularly infect the postgeneration. This rationalism is in the service 
of coming to terms with the past, and is called ‘working through’ precisely because it is not 
intended as a dismissal or turning away from trauma, but rather as a confrontation with it that 
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aims to place it in a historical rather than a universalist frame. One problem with the trauma 
discourse is the generalisation of trauma so that it encompasses all experience: everyone is 
traumatised by the nature of the human condition (broken from one’s past; deprived of one’s 
desires; abandoned, confused…); or conversely, the nature of trauma is so impossible to symbolise 
that one can never speak of it except as a kind of awe-inspiring, sublime object. Once again, this is 
not to dismiss it. LaCapra (1998, p.182) notes that ‘the question of memory may come to the 
forefront of attention or even be exaggerated precisely because of the difficulty of remembering 
events that defy the imagination and are not fully encompassed by conventional methods of 
representation,’ showing clear awareness of just how overwhelming the experience of trauma 
might be. Nevertheless, the task of memory is a real one: to inch towards a way of thinking about 
trauma, whether for oneself or one’s predecessors, that somehow puts it in its place, at least to the 
extent that this is possible, replacing the re-enactment of trauma with the possibility of thought. 
‘The challenge,’ he writes (p.183), taking issue with some of the more romanticised evocations of 
trauma to be found in the literature, ‘is not to dwell obsessively on trauma as an unclaimed 
experience that occasions the paradoxical witnessing of the breakdown of witnessing but rather to 
elaborate a mutually informative, critically questioning relation between memory and 
reconstruction that keeps one sensitive to the problematics of trauma.’  
The point is that historical trauma is always singular: this happened; this horror was perpetrated; 
this was done to someone by someone. Universalising trauma has poetic value and helps in evoking 
the potential for responding to testimonies; but mourning is over particular losses and needs to be 
granted this specificity if it is to allow the loss to have its full significance. Mourning something 
means being able to see what has been lost, not to universalise the loss so that everything loses 
meaning. ‘Indeed,’ writes LaCapra (2001, p. 65), ‘specific phantoms that possess the self or the 
community can be laid to rest through mourning only when they are specified and named as 
historically lost others.’ Memorialising means putting something in its place without reducing or 
belittling it. Of course the Holocaust and other genocides have universal significance, raising issues 
that need to be dealt with at the deepest theological, philosophical, sociopolitical and psychological 
levels; but they are also particular acts, and memory of the singularity they involve – the 
destruction of actual people and places – is essential if they are to be given the respect they are 
due. 
Memory of this kind is a mode of mourning in the service of laying something to rest. However, it 
may be impossible to mourn under some circumstances, especially in the absence of 
acknowledgement of what has been damaged and of the responsibility for what has happened. 
Some of this is related to the sheer scale of loss, which may not be measurable in purely 
quantitative terms: the significance of a singular loss can at times enlarge it over the massive 
nature of collective or genocidal destruction. ‘Inconsolable’ loss may indeed be inconsolable, not as 
a function of some neurosis in the griever but because of what hangs on that loss. Psychoanalysts 
might label this as melancholic loss without necessarily pathologising it, a loss that returns without 
ever being worked through. Yet even here the work of partial mourning is an engagement with life, 
and perhaps a central aspect of the task of those who are witness to grief – a reason why, for 
example, memorialisation of irreplaceable loss is worthwhile, and why the postgeneration might 
seek understanding and some kind of reparation for what has been done, noting the impossibility 
of ever laying things completely to rest. There is also another important distinction to be made, 
concerning who deserves remembrance, or perhaps better, the extent to which mourning can be 
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tolerated when what has sometimes to be mourned is unacceptable in itself. This is particularly an 
issue for the descendants of perpetrators. LaCapra comments, 
With respect to the dead who may not deserve mourning and a proper burial, one might 
contend that there are other forms of working-through, such as critique involving normative 
issues and the elaboration of nonfetishistic narratives – narratives that do not deny the 
trauma that called them into existence. (LaCapra, 1998, p. 205). 
LaCapra is again arguing for a mode of facing reality that may be psychologically impossible in its 
complete form, but nevertheless faces the postgeneration with an ethical demand to acknowledge 
what has happened ‘in their name’ (however much it was not in reality in their name) and to resist 
the strong and understandable temptation to back away from it. This temptation can be manifest 
in forms of denial; or in so identifying with the past as either to repeat it (the resurgence of 
antisemitism in Europe in recent years may be an example, as may be the nostalgic turn to 
nationalist authoritarianism) or to adopt a passionate stance of oneness with the victims that can 
leave insufficient space for difference and realistic acceptance of historical responsibilities. 
There is one more complexity that derives from different levels of personal responsibility and links 
back to the issue of intergenerational connectedness and postmemory. Whereas the receptive 
witness to trauma testimony might struggle to hear the detailed reality of the subject’s speech 
because of the complexity and sensitivity of listening required – the almost-impossible balance 
between identification and non-colonisation of the other’s experience – the implicated witness 
adds to this a more motivated repugnance, a temptation towards casting off the challenge of the 
other in order to protect the self. Benjamin (2016, 2017) classes this under the heading of ‘only one 
may live,’ indexing the fantasy that allowing for the other’s suffering somehow neglects one’s own. 
She also thinks that this has to do with the listener’s adoption of the victim position, something 
very regularly observed in political situations. Benjamin (2016, p.7) writes, ‘Our identification with 
the suffering of others can be interfered with by the identity of victimhood, in which a dissociated 
fear of forfeiting recognition plays a great role.’ If we are ‘victims’ too, it can be very hard to 
acknowledge others’ hurt, especially that hurt to which we have contributed, or are currently 
contributing. This is related to, but not the same as, the universalising tendency: if everyone suffers 
from trauma, then your suffering is no different in kind from mine, even if we might allow for 
quantitative variations. I can always translate what you say into what I have experienced, which in 
some ways allows for empathy, but in others is a colonising act that removes the singularity 
necessary for real witnessing to do its work in promoting the possibility of helping gain access to 
mourning. This is all a real danger, but the additional issue here is that the implicated witness who 
insists on her or his own suffering – for example, the suffering of the German people at the end of 
the Second World War, which was real and widespread – can be used to obscure the possibility of 
witnessing itself. The identity of victimhood can be a consciously or unconsciously competitive one, 
in which denigration of the other’s claims to suffering may be seen as necessary to bolstering one’s 
own. The defensive nature of this process is obvious, and so is its perniciously versatile usefulness: 
if I have suffered, then who are you to demand of me that I take responsibility for the hurt done to 
you? And yet, despite its transparency, competitive victimhood is precisely what seems to happen, 
whether in the micropolitics of interpersonal and familial relationships (I have been mistreated 
therefore mistreat you) or in many of the conflicts in which groups and socialities, even nations, 
find themselves embroiled. In this regard, postmemory, with its embodied identifications and 
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repetitions, needs to be deconstructed by active memorial work of a kind that allows these 
repetitions to be turned into processes of recovery and working through. Otherwise, not only will 
the ghosts remain unlaid, but new ones will keep on being created in their image. 
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